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 APPENDIX C. 
TRIADISM IN THE HISTORY OF 19TH 
AND EARLY 20TH CENTURY PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A brief introductory comment: in the sense of natural philosophy the Four 
Elements theory defines not only the constituents but also the quality of the physical 
sphere. Since constituents and quality must always be changing through becoming mixed 
together (krasis)—with both immediate and long-term effects—it is not surprising that, 
from the proper perspective, certain large chronological formations seem to emerge: that 
is, certain elements seem to predominate at certain times. But the chronological value of 
the theory is almost a side-effect of that ongoing flux of constituents and quality which 
provides an initial basis for an objective (scientific) investigation of the world.  
At the other pole, in psychology, which barely surfaces in conceptual form in 
Plato and Aristotle, a functional triadism can be discerned. It is not explicit in the same 
sense as Empedokles’ quadripartite world structure but it functions implicitly as inner 
pattern of the least physical of the four elements: fire/nous. However, this triadism was 
never given any canonical formulation; indeed, the separate versions of Plato and 
Aristotle were never reconciled, for the following age took no interest in the matter. 
Nevertheless, the principle that the nous had three functions, or consisted of three 
functions (thinking, feeling and willing), with a sequential aspect (important for relative 
chronology) serves as the formal link between four elements science and periodicity. This 
link is, in fact, virtually explicit in Plato and Aristotle (see Chapter I, The Three Faculties 
of the Ego, paragraph 11) but at the same time easily overlooked or undervalued.  
 
 
 
While the circumstances so far discussed might be sufficient to orient the reader about 
the nature of this book, the idea of a three-tiered ego is both unfamiliar enough at the 
present time and yet significant enough to justify my giving a brief account of its 
emergence as a psychological concept in modern times. I mention first that certain 
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philosophers and psychologists of the later 19th and earlier 20th centuries pondered the 
nature and functions of the ego, thus renewing, after a couple of generations, the quest 
after the foundation of human existence which had been pursued by Kant, Fichte and 
Hegel. But if the latter had made the ego the cornerstone of grand philosophical systems, 
their diadochian successors were more concerned with the concept of the “I” in terms of 
self-experience—virtually self-preoccupation—and it is not difficult to see how this kind 
of self-analysis could lead, on the one hand, to existentialism and, on the other, to 
psychoanalysis. For, whereas the philosophers of German idealism had still assumed a 
real spiritual world as the ultimate locus of the ego with its inner structure, the triumph 
of materialistic science in the intervening decades of the 19th century left the later 
thinkers stranded without a credible spiritual world to support them (see again 
Introduction, note 5). Thus, they had no alternative but to dissect their own ego 
consciousness as a closed-off phenomenon. What is of extreme interest is the way they 
did this, as I hope to show next.  
It does not lie in my competence to write a history of the conception that 
cognition, sensibility (sensory life) and intentioniality are the three interlocking faculties 
by which human consciousness orients and propels itself in the world. If I knew of such a 
history, I should certainly have consulted it. Here I can offer—obviously from a layman’ 
sperspective—only a few basic observations to supplement the considerations brought 
forward in the text.  
In a recent study E. T. Brann1 has shown that the difficult concept of the 
imagination and its role in philosophy drove the creators of the “grand modern systems”: 
Kant, J. G. Fichte and Hegel to an inwardizing analysis of the cognizing faculties. Kant, 
in the Critique of Pure Reason, did that in a thought structure based on cognition, 
sensibility and the ineluctible self: “an active subject....possessing a prudent reason—in 
fact, the will”. Neither Kant nor Brann recognizes these terms as being more than a tool 
(almost a convention) of philosophical reasoning nor did they pause over the fact that 
the concepts form a trio. Nevertheless, this framework—extraordinarily complex in its 
ramifications and bafflingly abstract to the non-specialist—in some way testifies to a bias 
towards triadic organization in western thought. In the same era J. G. Fichte produced 
another powerful system; his definition of the ego and non-ego as a way of giving 
Kantian thought a real focus has become the very ground of modern existence.2 Equally 
important was Hegel’s system of triadic processes in dialectical reasoning. With these 
systems the state at which Classical Greece entrusted philosophy to the world had been 
re-gained on a new and much more comprehensive basis which could serve as a 
springboard to a completely new era. My own intimation (above) that, instead of 
advance, there was a hiatus at this point is specifically confirmed by Brann (107) who 
speaks of a “philosophic eclipse” in the middle of the 19th century (in terms of her 
interest in imagination).  
Although the impetus of the grand systems as such was lost or dissipated during 
the “eclipse”, certain parts of them proved to be very fruitful in modern life.3 It seems 
possible to speak of a clarification of Kant’s three modalities as they would exist in a 
Fichtean ego, but an ego now very much thrown back on itself, as I suggested above.4 
These three Kantian modalities (cognition, sensibility, and will) reappear in a “mini-
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system” describing the stages of world-views: namely, the so-called “Structure of a World 
View” (see Appendix B) by Wilhelm Dilthey, who must have actually observed the system 
in his own “lived experience” (as Erlebnis is translated by Brann), since he was not given 
to depending on what he (sc. his ego) could not actually experience. In fact, it is well 
known that Dilthey, professor of philosophy at Berlin, desired to supplement the Kantian 
system by producing a structural system in mental life based on “lived experience”.5 His 
triadic threefold system ((see Chapter I, Recapitulation and Interpretation of Dilthey’s 
“Structure of a World View”, paragraph 3) as such seems not to have gained adherents 
in its entirety, but in general Dilthey was influential among the coterie of thinkers who 
produced important movements in the early 20th century, especially phenomenology 
and existentialism. Brann (110) stated that he was read and respected by both Husserl 
and Heidigger. And whether or not it is owing specifically to Dilthey, it is remarkable 
that so many intellectuals of his time reasoned in a triadic framework of the ego—even if 
they referred to it as “soul” or did not specifically use the words thinking, feeling and 
willing. For example, Edmund Husserl, who like Fichte had an almost obsessive 
preoccupation with the “I”, wrote of “the human ego who experiences (feels?), thinks and 
acts naturally in the world.”6 A critic of George Simmel (an almost exact contemporary of 
Husserl) summarizes:  
Experience, however, is not all of a piece. We experience in different modes. It is one 
thing to know an object, another to appreciate it as beautiful, and still another to revere it 
as an object of worship. In Simmel’s view the contents experienced in each of these three 
cases may be the same although they are not the same in experience.7  
The similarity to Dilthey’s system cannot be overlooked. Again, Rudolf Steiner, coming 
from a quite different direction, Goethe’s world view, nevertheless in 1917 defined these 
same three functions (thinking, feeling and willing) in such a way that their orderly 
progression in human life could be made the basis of his practical suggestions in various 
fields of human endeavor.8 Even Sigmund Freud worked within a framework of three 
levels of consciousness represented by the terms ego, superego and id.9 Did Freud intend 
to distance himself from philosophical stereotypes by turning the terms on their head or 
was he a creature of his era? It does not seem far-fetched to see the ego in this case as the 
thinking agent, the superego—often compared to conscience—as the ultimate instance of 
the will as it decides what is permissible behavior,10 and the id as unmitigated, emotional 
response to the world. In art historical reasoning also, feeling, thinking and willing 
appear (Riegl).11  
What strikes me about all this is that it confronts us with a transmutation of a 
Greek insight, however one may imagine this to have occurred (it is worth remarking 
that Dilthey must have been quite familiar with the works of Plato). Thus, in the very era 
in which the history of Greek art was being organized in modern terms (1880–1930) 
there was a philosophic mode of inquiry into ego-consciousness that was similar to, if 
not in fact ultimately derived from, ancient Greek philosophy and hence humanistic in 
its core. However, such a study as the present one could not have rested on a secure 
archeological foundation in the fifty years mentioned above. But enough factual 
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knowledge about Greek art has accumulated since then that it may not be out of place 
now.  
My attempt to study Greek art holistically thus builds upon the categories 
established by the last humanistic generation before the fragmentation of the later 20th 
century obscured its heritage, namely, content and structural functionality of human 
consciousness. In this study the Four Elements theory provides the content of each large 
era of Greek art, which was actually working on a different aspect of the same root idea, 
thus illustrating Simmel’s insight that the same content can be experienced quite 
differently at different times. Simultaneously Dilthey’s concept of triadic processes, 
working in effect cyclically but more in Hegel’s sense than in the specific ideation of the 
Greeks, explains how human consciousness shifts unceasingly from one aspect of 
content to another.  
 
 
 
There is one more basic problem in dealing with the art of the Greeks: the difference in 
their conception of time from ours. I am not speaking of the fact that they articulated 
years, for example, by Olympiads nor of the reverse counting in B.C. dates. There is a 
more profound difference grounded in the perception of most ancient peoples (the 
Hebrews excepted) that time is a matter of recurring cycles. Even the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition, with its view of cumulative events leading to the last judgment,12 shared with 
the endless-cycles peoples the concept of a divine origin of the cosmos.  
In the second half of the 19th century, the Bible-based conception of cosmic time 
as beginning in 4004 B.C. was swept away by the work of various scientists who inferred 
a chain of physico-chemical events stretching back indefinitely with no secure theory of 
organic inception, particularly of consciousness. The impersonality of this view of time 
facilitated a totally detached observation of natural phenomena, which then spread from 
the physical to the social sciences and beyond—to all aspects of conscious life. My 
intention in Chapters III-V is to step out of this customary, impersonal frame of 
reference and to participate as directly as possible in the (necessarily) quite different 
time-experience recoverable from Greek philosophy and art. I have attempted to do this 
through a consideration of the quality of historical consciousness preceding the shift 
from a cyclical time frame into a straight-line time frame (for an explanation see Chapter 
III, The Cyclical Quality of Greek Art, paragraphs 5–9).  
